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Nicholson: BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION V. CITY OF MIAMI

Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami
137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017)
I. INTRODUCTION
“Housing is the linchpin to civil rights.”1 When enacting the Fair
Housing Act (FHA), Congress declared that “[i]t is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.”2 Despite the legislative branch’s attempts,
racial discrimination in housing continues to plague the people of this
nation.3 When introducing amendments to the FHA in 1988, Senator
Edward Kennedy stated that in some ways, “housing discrimination is the
most invidious form of bigotry” because “[i]t isolates racial and ethnic
minorities and perpetuates the ignorance that is the core of bigotry.”4
The Fair Housing Act prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” on the
basis of race and a number of other characteristics.5 It also makes it
unlawful for “any person or other entity whose business includes engaging
in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions
of such a transaction” due to race.6
The FHA was originally enacted in 1968 but has been amended many
times.7 Initially, it “prohibited discrimination in residential ‘dwellings’ on
the basis of race, color, national origin, and religion.”8 “In 1974, the [FHA]
was amended to include sex and, in 1988, to include handicap. . . and
familial status[.]”9 Today, the FHA carries with it one of the broadest
assortments of remedies available under any federal civil rights statute.10
There are conflicting standards for what, or who, is considered a proper
FHA plaintiff.11 Those standards are the “Article III” interpretation and the
1. Michael P. Seng & F. Willis Caruso, Forty Years of Fair Housing: Where Do We Go From
Here?, J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L 235, 242 (Winter 2009).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Standing to Enforce the Fair Housing Act, ACSBLOG (Oct. 28,
2016), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/standing-to-enforce-the-fair -housing-act.
4. Seng & Caruso, supra note 1, at 236.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a) (2012).
7. D. BENJAMIN BARROS & ANNA P. HEMINGWAY, PROPERTY LAW 290 (2015).
8. Seng & Caruso, supra note 1, at 235.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Christopher M. Wildenhain, U.S. Supreme Court to Decide Scope of Right to Sue under
Federal Fair Housing Act, (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/litigationcommittees/commercial-business/practice/2016/scotus-decide-scope-of-right-to-sue-under-fha.html.
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“zone of interests” interpretation.12 To have Article III standing, a plaintiff,
at minimum, needs to allege that he or she has been injured, that the
defendant caused the injury, and that a favorable judicial decision would
likely redress the injury.13 In addition, the injury alleged by the plaintiff
must be “concrete and particularized.”14 On the other hand, the zone of
interests interpretation limits standing to sue under federal statutes to only
those persons who Congress sought to protect by passing the law.15 This
test is more challenging to pass.16
Under the FHA, “person” includes one or more individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, and a number of other entities.17
Furthermore, the FHA broadly defines an “aggrieved person” as any person
who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” or
“believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing
practice that is about to occur.”18 The FHA provides that an aggrieved
person may file a complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development19 or may commence a civil action in an appropriate court.20
In Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 21 the Supreme Court had the
chance to enlarge the scope of standing under the FHA by deciding whether
municipalities may have standing to sue as an aggrieved person.22 The
justices were tasked with determining whether the City of Miami’s
(hereinafter “City”) alleged injuries fell within the zone of interests and
proximate cause requirements of the FHA.23 The case was remanded for
further proceedings after the Court held that the City of Miami’s claimed
injuries fell within the zone of interests arguably protected by the FHA and
developed the applicable test for proximate cause, which it left to the court
of appeals to apply.24 After examining the facts and the majority and
dissenting opinions, this analysis will focus on the most significant impacts
that this holding will have on the communities within the City of Miami, the
lending industry, and the concern regarding the Court’s broad interpretation
of the zone of interests under the FHA.25
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)).
Spokeo, at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
Wildenhain, supra note 11.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 3602(i).
42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
Id at 1301-1302.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1305-06.
See infra Parts IV.B.1-3.
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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
“In 2013, the City of Miami brought lawsuits in federal court against
two banks, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.”26 The City’s complaints
alleged that the banks discriminatorily imposed more burdensome, and
“predatory,” conditions on loans issued to minority borrowers than to
similarly situated nonminority borrowers.27 “Those ‘predatory’ practices
included, among others, excessively high interest rates, unjustified fees,
teaser low-rate loans that overstated refinancing opportunities, large
prepayment penalties, and - when default loomed - unjustified refusals to
refinance or modify the loans.”28
The City of Miami alleged that due to the discriminatory nature of the
banks’ practices, the rates of default and foreclosure among minority
borrowers were higher than among otherwise similar white borrowers and
were concentrated in minority neighborhoods.29 Furthermore, the City
alleged that those higher foreclosure rates lowered property values and
diminished property tax revenue.30 The City then claimed that those higher
foreclosure rates, especially when paired with the resulting vacancies,
increased demand for municipal services, such as police, fire, and building
and code enforcement services, all of which were necessary to remedy the
blight and unsafe and dangerous conditions generated by the foreclosures
and vacancies.31 The City’s complaints described statistical analyses that
traced its’ financial losses to the banks’ discriminatory practices.32
Aside from economic injuries, the City of Miami claimed that the
banks’ discriminatory conduct adversely impacted the racial composition of
the City, impaired the City’s goals to assure racial integration and
desegregation, and frustrated the City’s longstanding and active interest in
promoting fair housing and securing the benefits of an integrated
community.33
The District Court dismissed the City’s complaints for three reasons.34
First, the court reasoned that the harms alleged, being economic rather than
discriminatory, fell outside the zone of interests the FHA protects.35
Second, “the complaints fail[ed] to show a sufficient causal connection

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1301-02.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1302.
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Id. at 1302.
Id.

3

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 44 [], Iss. 1, Art. 8

150

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

between the City’s injuries and the Banks’ discriminatory conduct.”36
Third, the complaints failed to allege unlawful activity occurring within the
FHA’s two-year statute of limitations.37 The City then filed amended
complaints, the ones viewed by the Supreme Court, and sought
reconsideration.38 The District Court held that the amended complaints only
answered the statute of limitations problem and consequently declined to
reconsider the dismissals.39
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
decision.40 It held that the City’s injuries fell within the “zone of interests”
that the FHA protects.41 It added that the City’s complaints sufficiently
alleged proximate cause.42 The court of appeals then remanded the cases
and ordered the District Court to accept the City’s amended complaints.43
The banks filed petitions for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.44
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.45 Justice
Gorsuch did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.46
In Part II, Justice Breyer began by discussing standing under the
Constitution.47 Article III of the Constitution restricts the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.”48 To satisfy this restriction, a
plaintiff must show an “‘injury in fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable’ to the
defendant’s conduct and ‘that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’”49
Justice Breyer then brought up the concept of “prudential” or
“statutory” standing.50 When discussing this form of standing, the Court
explained,
36. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1302.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1302.
40. Id.
41. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1300.
46. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1300.
47. Id. at 1302.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
49. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1302. (quoting Spokeo, at 1547).
50. Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss1/8

4

Nicholson: BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION V. CITY OF MIAMI

2018]

BANK OF AMERICA CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI

151

“prudential standing” was misleading, for the requirement at issue
is in reality tied
to a particular statute. The question is whether
the statute grants the plaintiff the
cause of action that he asserts.
In answering that question, we presume that a
statute
ordinarily provides a cause of action “only to plaintiffs whose
interests fall
within the zone of interests protected by the
51
law invoked.”
The Court has “added that ‘[w]hether a plaintiff comes within the ‘zone of
interests’ is an issue that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action
encompasses a particular plaintiff’s claim.’”52
At this point, the majority concluded that the City of Miami’s financial
injuries, specifically its lost tax revenue and extra municipal expenses,
satisfied the “prudential standing” requirement.53 “[T]he City’s claims of
injury it suffered as a result of the statutory violations [were], at the least,
‘arguably within the zone of interests’ that the FHA protects.”54
After reiterating the Fair Housing Act’s definition of “aggrieved
person,” Justice Breyer discussed the Court’s previous interpretations of
that phrase.55 “This Court has repeatedly written that the FHA’s definition
of person ‘aggrieved’ reflects a congressional intent to confer standing
broadly.”56 The definition of “person aggrieved” in the original version of
the FHA “showed ‘a congressional intention to define standing as broadly
as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.’”57
The majority opinion then went on to introduce the most relevant
precedent to the case at hand.58 First, in Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co.,59 one black tenant and one white tenant alleged that the owner of their
apartment complex had discriminated against non-whites on the basis of
race in the rental of apartments within the complex in violation of the
FHA.60 The Supreme Court held that the FHA permits suits by white
51. Id. (quoting Lexmark Int’l, 134 S. Ct. at 1387-88) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 1302-03. (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387) (some internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. Id. at 1303.
54. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); citing Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 372, 375-76 (1982); Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176 (2011);
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165-66 (1997)).
58. Id. at 1303.
59. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
60. Id. at 206-07.
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tenants alleging that they were deprived benefits from interracial
associations when discriminatory rental practices kept minorities out of their
apartment complex.61
Then, in Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood,62 a village alleged that
it lost tax income and had the racial equilibrium of its community upset by
racial-steering practices.63 The Supreme Court held that if Gladstone’s sales
conduct had actually begun to rob the village of its racial balance and
stability, the village had standing to challenge the legality of that practice.64
Lastly, in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,65 three individual plaintiffs
and a nonprofit corporation known as HOME filed suit against Havens
Realty and one of its employees.66 The individual plaintiffs alleged that
they had been injured by the discriminatory acts of Havens by being
deprived of the numerous benefits that arise from living in integrated
communities.67 HOME alleged injury in that the steering practices of
Havens had frustrated its counseling and referral services, thereby draining
its resources.68 The Court held that the nonprofit organization did have
standing to sue because it had spent money to combat housing
discrimination.69
The Supreme Court has held that the FHA allows suits by a wide
variety of plaintiffs.70 Justice Breyer emphasized that contrary to the
dissent’s view, the three main precedent cases did more than suggest that
plaintiffs in similar circumstances to the City of Miami had a cause of
action under the FHA; the cases held as much.71 To support this
proposition, Justice Breyer recited the important holdings of the three cases
just mentioned, wherein the Court held that the FHA “allows suits by white
tenants claiming that they were deprived of benefits [arising] from
interracial associations when discriminatory rental practices kept minorities
out of their apartment complex” in Trafficante; “a village alleging that it
lost tax revenue and had the racial balance of its community undermined by
racial-steering practices” in Gladstone; and a nonprofit organization that
expended funds to combat housing discrimination in Havens Realty.72

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-12).
441 U.S. 91 (1979).
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (citing Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11).
Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 111.
455 U.S. 363 (1982).
Id. at 367-68.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Bank of. Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Breyer then moved on to discuss Congress’ ratification of the
Court’s broad construction of the “person aggrieved” language.73 When
Congress amended the FHA in 1988, it retained without noteworthy change
the definition of “person aggrieved” that the Court had adopted, which was
that that language reflected a congressional intent to confer standing
broadly.74 Certainly, Congress “was aware of” the Court’s precedent and
“made a considered judgment to retain the relevant statutory text.”75 By not
changing the language or statutory definition of “person aggrieved,”
Congress signaled approval of the Court’s generous interpretation.76
Next, the Court discussed the banks’ arguments in regard to the broad
reach of the words “aggrieved person” as defined in the FHA.77 The banks’
main concern was that providing everyone with constitutional standing
under the FHA would lead to farfetched results.78 For example, if
restaurants, plumbers, utility companies, or any other participants in the
economy of the City could sue to recover business lost when people had to
leave the neighborhood as a result of the banks’ alleged discriminatory
lending practices, a legal anomaly would occur.79
The majority nonetheless determined that the City’s financial injuries
fell within the zone of interests protected by the FHA, and this conclusion
was amply supported by case law.80 The Court specifically referred to
Gladstone, wherein a village alleged that it was “‘injured by having [its]
housing market. . .wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the economic and
social detriment of the citizens of [the] village.’”81 In Gladstone, the Court
held that the village could bring suit because the circumstances that resulted
from the manipulation of the village’s housing market produced a
“‘significant reduction in property values [that] directly injures a
municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear
the costs of local government and to provide services.’”82 That situation
was remarkably similar to the one faced by the City of Miami—therefore,
principles of stare decisis compelled the Court’s adherence to that
precedent.83

73. Id.
74. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303.
75. Id. at 1303-04 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Hous. And Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities
Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2015)).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 1304.
78. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1304.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 95.
82. Id. at 1304-05 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110-11).
83. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1305.
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After holding that the City’s injuries arguably fell within the zone of
interests protected by the FHA, the majority began its discussion of
proximate cause.84 The question considered by the Court was whether the
banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending practices proximately caused the
City to lose property tax revenue and spend more on municipal services.85
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that
foreseeability alone was insufficient to establish proximate cause under the
FHA.86
“‘Proximate-cause analysis is controlled by the nature of the statutory
cause of action. The question it presents is whether the harm alleged has a
sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.’”87
Because a claim for damages under the FHA is akin to a “tort action,”88 it is
no exception to the traditional requirement that in “‘all cases of loss, we are
to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.’”89
The Court then explained that in this case, the conduct the statute
prohibits consists of deliberately lending to minority borrowers on more
inferior terms than similarly situated and equally creditworthy nonminority
borrowers and bringing about defaults by failing to extend refinancing and
loan modifications to minority borrowers on fair terms.90 By way of
establishing proximate cause, the City claimed that the banks’ misconduct
led to a disproportionate number of foreclosures and vacancies in certain
neighborhoods.91 These foreclosures and vacancies allegedly injured the
City, which lost property tax revenue when the values of the properties in
those areas decreased and the City was forced to spend more on municipal
services in those areas.92
The Supreme Court stated that the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding that
foreseeability alone is sufficient to establish proximate cause under the
FHA.93 Within the confines of the FHA, “foreseeability alone does not
ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.”94 The majority
noted that the housing market is interconnected with economic and social
life; therefore, a violation of the FHA may “‘be expected to cause ripples of

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1305 (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390).
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1305 (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)).
Id. (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol44/iss1/8

8

Nicholson: BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION V. CITY OF MIAMI

2018]

BANK OF AMERICA CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI

155

harm to flow’” far beyond the defendant’s alleged misconduct.95
Furthermore, entertaining lawsuits to recuperate damages for any
foreseeable consequence of an FHA violation would risk “‘massive and
complex damages litigation.’”96
The majority then reined in the contours of proximate cause under the
FHA by holding that it requires “‘some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”97 Since an action under the
FHA “‘is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common
law,’”98 directness principles are applied.99
Although both parties asked the Court to draw clear-cut boundaries of
proximate cause under the FHA and to determine on which side the City’s
financial injuries lay, the Court declined to do so.100 The majority asked the
lower courts to decide the contours of proximate cause under the FHA and
apply that standard to the City’s claims of lost property tax revenue and
increased municipal expenses.101 However, because the Court laid out its
idea of proximate cause under the FHA, the lower courts are obliged to
follow it, or at the very least, to use it as a starting point on remand.102
B. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito joined,
delivered the minority opinion, both concurring in part and dissenting in
part.103 The dissent began by emphasizing its opinion of the weaknesses of
the City of Miami’s claims.104 The City did not allege that any defendant
discriminated against it within the meaning of the FHA; neither was the
City endeavoring to bring suit on behalf of its residents against whom the
banks allegedly discriminated.105 Instead, the dissent explained, the City’s
theory was that between 2004 and 2012, the banks’ “allegedly
discriminatory mortgage-lending practices led to defaulted loans, which led
to foreclosures, which led to vacant houses, which led to decreased property

95. Id. (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983)).
96. Id. (quoting Associated General, 459 U.S. at 545).
97. Id. (quoting Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)).
98. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
99. Id. (citing Anza v. Ideal Steal Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion left little doubt that
Miami could satisfy the rigorous standard for proximate cause that the majority adopted and left to the
Court of Appeals to apply).
103. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1307.
105. Id.
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values, which led to reduced property taxes and urban blight.”106 This
attenuated chain of causation foreshadowed the dissent’s view on proximate
cause under the FHA.
Before diving deeply into his reasoning, Justice Thomas briefly stated
that he would hold that the City’s injuries fall outside the FHA’s zone of
interests and that in any event, the City’s alleged injuries are too remote to
satisfy the FHA’s proximate cause requirement.107
The dissent began its reasoning by noting, similarly to the majority, that
the zone of interests requirement is “‘root[ed]’ in the ‘common-law rule’”
which provides:
that a plaintiff may “recover under the law of negligence for injuries
caused by a violation of a statute” only if “the statute ‘is interpreted
as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact
occurred as a result of its violation.’108
To justify its opinion that the City’s alleged injuries fall outside the
zone of interests protected by the FHA, the dissent examined the text of the
statute itself.109 There is no indication in the text of the FHA that suggests
that Congress intended to deviate from the zone of interests limitation.110
The statute’s private enforcement mechanism, by which an aggrieved
person may sue, did not hint, much less expressly provide, that Congress
sought to depart from the common-law rule.111
The dissent then brings up cases in which the same conclusion was
reached with regard to similar language in other statutes.112 In Thompson v.
North Am. Stainless, LP,113 the Court considered Title VII’s privateenforcement mechanism, which provides that “‘a person claiming to be
aggrieved’” may file an employment discrimination charge with the
EEOC.114 The Court unanimously concluded that Congress did not deviate
from the zone of interests limitation in Title VII by using that language.115
However, as the majority pointed out, the language examined in Thompson
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1307. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lexmark, 134 S. Ct.
at 1389 n.5; W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS
§ 36 (5th ed. 1984)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1307-08.
112. Id. at 1308.
113. 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
114. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1308 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S.
at 173).
115. Id. (quoting Thomspon, 562 U.S. at 175-78).
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addressed who may sue under Title VII, the employment discrimination
statute, not under the FHA.116
The dissent proceeded by mentioning that the language in Trafficante,
Gladstone, and Havens which stated that the FHA’s zone of interests
extends to the limits of Article III was “ill-considered dictum” leading to
“absurd consequences.”117 Justice Thomas stated that the Court has
observed that the holdings of those cases are compatible with the zone of
interests limitation described in Thompson.118 That limitation states that a
plaintiff may not sue when his or her “‘interests are so marginally related to
or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.’”119 Plaintiffs who may
technically be injured in an Article III sense but whose interests are
unrelated to the statutory prohibitions are thus excluded.120 However, again,
the statutory language the dissent was referring to here was found not in the
FHA, but in the employment discrimination statute.121
In Justice Thomas’ view, the injuries asserted by the City were “‘so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes’ of the FHA that they
fell outside the applicable zone of interests.”122 The City’s asserted injuries
were not arguably related to the interests the statute protects, according to
the dissent.123 The dissent supported this by arguing that “nothing in the
text of the FHA suggests that Congress was concerned about decreased
property values, foreclosures, and urban blight, much less about the strains
on municipal budgets that might follow.”124
The dissent then contended that the City of Miami’s interests were
markedly distinct from the interests confronted by the Court in Trafficante,
Gladstone, and Havens.125 The City’s asserted injuries implicated none of
the interests that were present in those three cases.126 The City did not
assert that it was injured based on efforts by the banks to steer certain
residents into one neighborhood rather than another, nor did the City allege
that it was injured because its neighborhoods were segregated.127

116.
117.
118.
119.
at 178).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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Id. at 1308 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176).
Id.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1308 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1308 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1309.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1309 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id.
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The dissent concluded its zone of interests discussion by stating that the
City of Miami was not similarly situated to the plaintiffs in Trafficante,
Gladstone, and Havens.128 Instead, Miami claimed injuries resulted from
foreclosed-upon and then vacant homes, which the FHA’s zone of interests
is not expansive enough to cover.129
In addition, the dissent responds to the majority’s reliance on a brief
mention of budget-related injury in Gladstone.130 Justice Thomas stated
that “[t]he fact that the village plaintiff asserted a budget-related injury in
addition to its racial-steering injury does not mean that a city alleging only a
budget-related injury is allowed to sue.”131
Justice Thomas went on to address what he considered to be
weaknesses in the majority opinion.132 He pointed out that the Court did not
reaffirm the broad language in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens which
suggested that Congress intended to permit any person with Article III
standing to sue under the FHA.133 Second, the majority did not reject the
banks’ arguments about other kinds of injuries that fall outside the FHA’s
zone of interests.134 The majority decided that it need not discuss the
floodgates argument brought up by the banks because precedent compelled
the conclusion that the City could sue.135 The dissent disagreed and said
that the majority opinion should not be read to allow suits by local
businesses alleging similar injuries to those alleged by the City.136
Justice Thomas then transitioned to the issue of proximate cause.137 He
agreed with the majority on this issue by stating that the Court correctly
held that foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish proximate cause
under the FHA and that the statute requires “‘some direct relation between
the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”138
In contrast with the majority, the dissent noted that this case came to the
Court on a motion to dismiss, so the court of appeals had no advantage over
the justices in evaluating the complaint’s theory of proximate cause. 139
Justice Thomas boldly argued that the majority opinion left little doubt that
neither the City nor any plaintiff alleging similar injuries could satisfy the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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rigorous standard for proximate cause that the Court adopted and left to the
court of appeals to apply.140
The dissent then illustrated the City’s own account of causation which it
believed showed that the link between the alleged FHA violation and its
asserted injuries was extremely attenuated.141 Furthermore, the dissent
confidently stated that the court of appeals would “not need to look far to
discern other, independent events that might well have caused the injuries”
alleged by the City of Miami.142
In light of this attenuated chain of causation, the dissent believed that
the City’s alleged injuries were too remote from the injurious conduct it
alleged. 143 The dissent would have held that the City failed to adequately
plead proximate cause under the FHA.144
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

The FHA was first enacted in the midst of racial turmoil and was meant
to assist in reversing the trend of segregation,145 but cases just like Bank of
Am. Corp. illustrate that the FHA has not worked perfectly.146 The statute
has had many successes, including the enjoinment of land use policies that
restrict housing for classes protected under it and the enjoinment of property
insurers from redlining minority neighborhoods, 147 but clearly, some
predatory lenders are still attempting to bypass some of the provisions of the
FHA.148
The Court’s decision in this case will have an impact on the
communities within the City of Miami as well as a possible impact on
predatory lending practices, but the most obvious result of this case is a
widening of the scope of standing under the FHA.149

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1311-12.
144. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
145. Seng & Caruso, supra note 1, at 235.
146. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301. (arguing that the FHA has not worked perfectly
because the City of Miami suffered injuries as a result of discriminatory lenders not abiding by the
statute.).
147. Seng & Caruso, supra note 1, at 239.
148. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301. (the City of Miami alleging that the Banks
discriminatorily imposed more predatory conditions on loans made to minority borrowers than to
nonminority borrowers, in violation of the FHA).
149. See infra Parts IV.B.1-3.
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B. Discussion
1. The Impact on Affordable Housing in the City’s Communities
This case was not the first time Florida has had problems with Bank of
America.150 A newspaper article published in August of 2014 detailed the
circumstances of a $1 billion settlement between 17,000 Floridians and
Bank of America.151
Bank of America Corp. agreed to pay $16.65 billion to end federal,
Florida, and other state investigations into the sale of toxic
mortgage securities during the subprime housing boom.152 The
settlement include[d] $9.65 billion in fines and $7 billion in aid to
communities and homeowners hit hard by the housing market crash
that triggered the Great Recession.153
Then-Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. described Bank of
America’s acts as “‘pervasive schemes to defraud financial institutions and
other investors.’”154 At the time the article was published, details were still
being decided in regards to who in Florida would receive the aid and how
much.155 Programs were set up to include principal reduction and
forgiveness, loan modifications, and new loans to credit-worthy borrowers
struggling to get a loan, according to Attorney General Spokesman Whitney
Ray.156 In addition, there would be financing for affordable rental housing
and donations given to assist communities still in recovery from the
financial crisis.157
Overall, Florida would receive around one seventh of the settlement’s
$7 billion in aid to communities and homeowners devastated by the housing
market crash.158 The majority of the toxic loans that backed the securities
came from firms acquired by Bank of America in 2008, including
Countrywide Financial Corporation of Calabasas and Merrill Lynch.159
Bank of America sustained about $60 billion in losses and legal settlements

150. See Donna Gehrke-White, Florida to Get $1 Billion From Bank of America Settlement, SUN
SENTINEL (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-bank-of-america-settlement-florida20140821-story.html.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Gehrke-White, supra note 150.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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from the acquisition of Countrywide, which during the housing boom of the
mid-2000s, was one of the nation’s largest subprime mortgage lenders.160
Litigation in Bank of Am. Corp. began in 2013, before that settlement
occurred.161 However, the bank’s suspicious practices had apparently been
going on for some time.162 The bank’s alleged discriminatory lending
practices that resulted in injuries to the City of Miami occurred between
2004 and 2012, according to the City.163 The sale of toxic mortgage
securities and the alleged discriminatory lending practices seemingly
coincided.164
Perhaps in response to the litigation, Bank of America announced a new
mortgage program for low- and moderate-income borrowers in February of
2016.165 One newspaper article stated that “[t]he bank [would] sell the
loans, including the servicing rights, to Self-Help, a community
development lender that provides financing to families, individuals, and
businesses underserved by traditional financial institutions.”166 Self-Help
would also offer post-closing counseling for borrowers who might be
experiencing payment difficulties.167
Freddie Mac worked together with Bank of America and Self-Help to
delineate credit terms and approved Self-Help as a seller and servicer to
facilitate the new program.168 Freddie Mac purchased all of the qualified
affordable mortgages originated through the Self-Help and Bank of America
partnership.169 This program was called the Affordable Loan Solution, and
it would allow payments as low as three percent on the purchase of a
primary, single-family residence.170 “Loan amounts [would] be within
conforming loan limits . . . and applicants’ income [could not] exceed 100
percent of the HUD area median income.”171
While this was a great start to aid in the struggle for affordable housing,
it was more about repairing Bank of America’s reputation, and it could not

160. Donna Gehrke-White, supra note 150.
161. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
162. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1307 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the City of
Miami theorized that the Banks’ allegedly discriminatory practices began in 2004.).
163. Id.
164. See Donna Gehrke-White, supra note 150; Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1307 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
165. Bank of America Announces Mortgages for Low- And Moderate-Income Borrowers, SUN
SENTINEL (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/fl-bank-of-america-mortgage20160229-story.html [hereinafter BOA Announces].
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. BOA Announces, supra note 165.
171. Id.
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erase the damage that was already done in places like the City of Miami.172
The people and families who lost their homes did not necessarily lose their
homes because they could not afford their mortgage payments; they lost
their homes because they were issued “riskier mortgages on less favorable
terms” than were issued to similarly situated nonminority borrowers.173 If
the minority borrowers had been given the mortgages they were worthy of,
perhaps the whole dispute could have been avoided. However, because the
Supreme Court enlarged the scope of the standing, municipalities now have
a higher likelihood of prevailing in suits under the FHA, which will be
beneficial to those individuals and families who are harmed due to
violations of the FHA that they cannot afford to legally pursue themselves.
Of course, the minority borrowers whose homes were foreclosed on
were negatively affected by the banks’ alleged discriminatory conduct, but
during oral arguments, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized the community
harms the FHA focuses on.174
But the FHA is a very peculiar and distinctive kind of antidiscrimination statute,
which really is focusing on community
harms . . . [s]o it’s not just individuals
who are harmed; it’s
communities who are harmed. And that’s the basic idea of the
entire statute, why Congress passed it. And here the cities are
standing up and
saying, every time you do this redlining and
this reverse redlining, essentially a community
is
becoming
blighted. And who better than the City to recognize that interest
and to assert it.175
It could not easily be expected that the people who were dislocated as a
result of losing their homes could assert their rights against the banks under
the FHA.176 Although the City did not bring suit directly on behalf of those
people and it was asserting its own injuries, Justice Kagan spoke to the fact
172. See John Maxfield, It’s Official: Bank of America Has the Worst Reputation in the Banking
MOTLEY
FOOL
(June
25,
2013,
12:00
AM),
Industry,
THE
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/06/25/its-official-bank-of-america-has-the-worstreputat.aspx (stating that Bank of America’s reputation suffered after it allegedly systematically and
unjustly denied mortgage modifications under a previous mortgage modification program); see also
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301-02 (stating that the discriminatory nature of the Bank’s practices
caused default and foreclosure rates among minority borrowers to be higher than among otherwise
similarly situated white borrowers, among other things).
173. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
174. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 151111).
175. Id.
176. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 391 (2006) (noting that many victimized borrowers are not wellequipped to protect themselves and are even more ill-equipped to pursue litigation).
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that the people who were dealt unfavorable mortgages were not the only
victims.177 The entire City felt not only the racial impact of the banks’
conduct but the economic impact as well, and the City was in a much better
position to challenge the banks’ practices.178
The concern of what happened to the borrowers after they lost their
homes is also present. The City of Miami is still plagued by the struggle for
affordable housing, which could only have increased when so many people
were forced to find elsewhere to live after their homes were foreclosed.179
On August 1, 2017, an article about affordable housing was published in the
Miami Today newspaper.180 Mayor Carlos Gimènez of Miami issued a
report detailing affordable housing completions and listed projects “stuck in
the pipeline” from April 1 to June 30.181 The report showed that the county
provided financial aid to only one finished affordable housing development
in those three months, adding up to eighty-four rental units at a cost from
county funds of $1.75 million.182
Miami is experiencing a growing population with a large bulge at the
lower end of the income scale, which only intensifies the need for
affordable housing.183 Only 400-500 housing units are expected to be
finished yearly over a ten year period.184 That pace is far too slow to keep
up with the need for affordable housing.185
A greater need for affordable housing is a predictable result of
discriminatory lending practices.186 This is because of the dire financial
state the borrowers end up in after being issued unfavorable mortgages as
well as the City’s loss of property tax revenues, which could have been used
to fund more affordable housing.187 However unfortunate it is, the City of
Miami is likely to continue to suffer from a lack of affordable housing in the
177. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No.
15-1111).
178. Id.
179. See Michael Lewis, Why Does Our Approved Affordable Housing Take So Long?, MIAMI
TODAY (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.miamitodaynews.com/2017/08/01/approved-affordable-housingtake-long/.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Lewis, supra note 176.
185. Id.
186. See Richard Rothstein, A Comment On Bank Of America/Countrywide’s Discriminatory
Mortgage Lending And Its Implications For Racial Segregation, ECON. POLICY INST. (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp335-boa-countrywide-discriminatory-lending/
(“foreclosures
stemming from reverse redlining have led to the displacement of many African-American and Hispanic
families, leaving many of them few option but to go to . . . poorer ghettos.”).
187. See id. (stating that minority neighborhoods with high proportions of subprime mortgages
suffered an epidemic of foreclosures and in affected neighborhoods, city governments had to step in to
provide extra services that abandoned properties require).
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wake of Bank of Am. Corp., unless the City is able to triumph on remand
and recover a judgment that would enable it to gain funds to repair the state
it is in. Justice Kagan described it this way:
Well, but [the City is] a person aggrieved under the – given
Congress’ purposes in the Act, because [it is] saying, as you did this
redlining, as you did this reverse redlining, our communities, the
thing that makes us a city was becoming more and more blighted,
and that’s what we are trying to recover for, the – the costs of
responding to that, the – the costs of not having revenues in order to
carry out our services for that community and for others. . . This is
their own interest in maintaining their communities free of the kind
of racial discrimination that the Act says causes neighborhood
blight.188
According to the dissent, the chain of causation is already attenuated,189
but it can theoretically be taken further. The City claims that as a result of
the banks’ discriminatory loan practices, minority borrowers were likely to
default on their mortgages, leading to foreclosures.190 The vacant houses
then led to decreased property values for the surrounding homes.191 Those
decreased property values led to homeowners paying lower property taxes
to the city government.192 In addition, the foreclosed-upon and vacant
homes led to criminal activity and threats to public health and safety, which
the City had to address through the expenditure of municipal resources.193
Hypothetically, those expenditures of municipal resources would take
away from the funds available to the establishment of affordable housing,
all while the need for that affordable housing rises because of the displaced
borrowers who are now in a bad place financially. Unless the City of
Miami is somehow able to recover the lost funds, hopefully from a
judgment in its favor, it is likely to continue to suffer from the negative
effects of the banks’ alleged discriminatory practices and a lack of
affordable housing. That the City of Miami even had the courage to bring
this suit sends a strong message to predatory lenders that their practices are
not going unnoticed. If the City wins on remand, the injured people and
families may not benefit directly, but at least the banks will be held
accountable.
188.
1111).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. A Warning Against Predatory Lending
During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts asked Robert Peck,
arguing on behalf of the City of Miami, about the difference between
subprime loans and predatory loans.194 Peck responded that:
predatory loans are used as sort of a generic term to talk about
taking advantage of a borrower. Subprime loans are – are simply
those loans that have interest rates that are so low that it looks like
it’s a wonderful deal until, of course, you look at some of – some of
the balloon payments . . . .195
Banks have historically contributed to the problem of racial
discrimination through their lending practices.196 Predatory lending enters
communities and leaves distressed properties and desperate people in its
wake.197 “The task of cleaning up falls to cities, yet predatory lending
reduces the resources available for this clean up. Declining property values
resulting from predatory lending mean reduced tax revenues just as
abandoned buildings lead to increased demand for fire and police
protection.”198 This sounds extraordinarily parallel to the injuries alleged by
the City of Miami.199
Predatory lenders sometimes market to people who have little or no
experience with mortgage loans and who do not have adequate skills to
understand contractual terms or are able to engage in a meaningful valuation
of their options.200 In the case of Bank of Am. Corp., the lenders allegedly
intentionally targeted African-American and Latino customers by issuing
them mortgages with less favorable terms than similarly situated white
customers.201 Foreclosure occurred seven times more frequently for some
minorities in the City than for non-minority borrowers.202
Eventually, those borrowers with predatory loans who fail to meet their
repayment responsibilities lose their homes to foreclosure.203 Many
researchers are finding that much of the dramatic rise in foreclosures that

194.
1111).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
1111).
203.
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15Id. at 39-40.
Chemerinsky, supra note 3.
Engel, supra note 176, at 355.
Id.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
Engel, supra note 176, at 356.
Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1300-01.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15Engel, supra note 176, at 357.
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took place in the mid-2000s was due to predatory lending.204 In addition,
predatory lending causes cities to lose vital property tax revenues,205 while
at the same time, experiencing greater demands for fire and police
protection and city sanitation services.206 The ability of cities to recover the
costs associated with predatory lending depends on whether they can
establish standing before the courts.207
The City of Miami claimed that it experienced these exact effects as a
result of the allegedly predatory lending tactics of the banks.208 Before the
City of Miami brought its case, the cities of Memphis, Tennessee and
Baltimore, Maryland both brought cases with identical types of allegations
that ended up settling for less than $10 million each.209 The City of Miami
is not the first municipality to assert standing under the FHA and it certainly
will not be the last, particularly now that the Supreme Court has given
municipalities a chance.210
Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bank of Am. Corp.,
municipalities are much more likely to assert claims against predatory
lenders under the FHA. Because the City of Miami’s claims are able to
proceed, so might the allegations of a host of other entities who might claim
harm from a foreclosure of a person denied a loan or given less favorable
loan terms on account of alleged discrimination.211
This expansion of FHA standing would likely necessitate the lending
industry to adjust its practices, including a possible tightening of credit.212
Because municipalities can now bring suit for lost property tax revenues and
increased municipal expenditures due to vacant homes, so long as they can
prove proximate cause, banks and lenders engaging in predatory and
discriminatory lending are far more likely to get caught and be held
accountable.213 Much of this will depend on what the court of appeals has
to say when it decides the proximate cause issue on remand, but just the fact

204. Id.
205. Id. at 359.
206. Id. at 358-59.
207. Id. at 360.
208. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
209. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Bank of America Corporation, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 151111).
210. Id. (stating that Memphis, Tennessee and Baltimore, Maryland brought cases with identical
types of allegations); see Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303 (stating that the City’s claims of
financial injury satisfy the prudential standing requirement).
211. Wildenhain, supra note 11.
212. Id.
213. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1303, 1309. (explaining that lost tax revenue and extra
municipal expenses satisfy the prudential standing requirement and that proximate cause under the FHA
requires a direct relation between the alleged injury and the injurious conduct alleged).
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that municipalities now have standing to assert economic injuries should be
considered a warning to all predatory and discriminatory lenders.214
With the ability to pursue claims against predatory lenders, cities may
now more effectively protect their citizens and recover damages for the
harms imposed on the cities themselves.215 “[L]awsuits [by municipalities]
have the potential to force predatory lenders to internalize the externalities
their lending creates, thereby reducing their incentives to engage in abusive
lending practices.”216 Municipalities around the nation now have a way to
redress the negative financial effects of predatory and discriminatory
lending.217 Viewing this optimistically, this may decrease predatory lending
practices, which will benefit communities and municipalities as well as
individual borrowers218.
3. The Floodgates Issue and the Expansion of Standing
The banks were very concerned that taking the Court’s previous words
literally and allowing everyone with constitutional standing to bring a cause
of action under the FHA “would produce a legal anomaly.”219 They argued
that allowing restaurants, plumbers, utility companies, or any other
participant in the local economy to sue them to recover business they lost
when people had to give up their homes and leave the neighborhood due to
the banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending practices would produce
farfetched results.220
The basis for this argument was the Court’s reasoning in Thompson v.
North Am. Stainless, LP.221 There, the Court held that the words “person
claiming to be aggrieved” in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the
employment discrimination statute, did not stretch that statute’s zone of

214. See id. at 1301 (stating that the City’s claimed injuries fall within the zone of interests
arguably protected by the FHA and that proximate cause requires more than a showing that the alleged
injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violation. Because municipalities may now have
standing, they become more likely to bring suit to redress their injuries).
215. Kathleen C. Engel, supra note 176, at 391.
216. Id.
217. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301 (stating that a municipality’s claims of financial
injuries satisfy the prudential standing requirement and that to establish proximate cause under the FHA,
a plaintiff must do more than show that its injuries resulted from the alleged statutory violation).
218. See id. at 1301, 1306 (stating that a municipality’s claims of financial injuries fall within the
zone of interests arguably protected by the FHA and that to establish proximate cause under the FHA, a
plaintiff must show more than that its injuries foreseeably flowed from the alleged statutory violations).
Because municipalities may now have standing under the FHA, they are more likely bring suit to redress
their injuries, therefore holding discriminatory lenders more accountable and hopefully reducing
predatory lending practices. Id.
219. Id. at 1304.
220. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1304.
221. Id.
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interest to the limits of Article III.222 The Court reasoned that such an
interpretation would lead to farfetched results.223
For example, a
shareholder in a company could bring a Title VII suit against the company
for discriminatorily terminating an employee.224 In relation to the FHA, the
banks believed that a zone of interests that large could not have been the
intent of Congress.225
The majority did not discuss this portion of the banks’ argument at
length because it found that the City’s financial injuries fell within the zone
of interests protected by the FHA.226 However, the Court vaguely addressed
the possibility of an overly-broad interpretation of FHA standing in its
discussion of proximate cause.227 While that may not have been the Court’s
intention, it is a possible effect. The majority stated that “[i]n the context of
the FHA, foreseeability alone does not ensure the close connection that
proximate cause requires.”228 Because the housing market is intertwined
with economic and social life, a violation of the FHA may “‘be expected to
cause ripples of harm to flow’ far beyond the defendant’s misconduct.”229
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that nothing in the FHA suggested that
Congress intended to provide a remedy wherever those ripples may travel,
and considering suits to recover damages for any foreseeable result of an
FHA violation would risk “‘massive and complex damages litigation.’”230
This could be viewed as the Court’s way of limiting the pool of
potential FHA plaintiffs. It is foreseeable that restaurants, plumbers, utility
companies and numerous other entities could suffer financial losses as a
result of having fewer customers when people are forced to leave the area
when their homes are foreclosed, but by reeling in the standard for
proximate cause under the FHA, the majority made sure that not just anyone
who foreseeably experienced financial loss as a result of the banks’ alleged
misconduct could sue under the FHA.231 Rather, potential plaintiffs are
required to show “‘some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged.’”232
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1304.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1306.
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Associated General, 459 U.S. at 534).
230. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting Associated General, 459 U.S. at 545).
231. See id. at 1306 (stating that foreseeability alone is insufficient to establish proximate cause
under the FHA because it does not ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires).
Therefore, to satisfy proximate cause under the FHA, a plaintiff must show more than that its injuries
were a foreseeable result of the alleged statutory violation. Id.
232. Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
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While the dissent disagreed with the majority’s zone of interests
holding, it did state that at least the Court’s opinion was narrow.233
Moreover, the dissent explained that the majority opinion should not be read
to authorize suits by local businesses alleging the same injuries that the City
alleged.234 The dissent believed that the majority left little doubt that the
City or any similarly situated plaintiff could satisfy the rigorous standard for
proximate cause adopted by the Court235 and would have held that the City’s
alleged injuries were too remote to satisfy the FHA’s proximate cause
requirement.236
If the FHA had been interpreted to be as broad as Article III permits,
absurd consequences could have followed.237 If the Court had held that the
FHA requires only broad constitutional standing, a shareholder would be
allowed to sue a real estate firm for the diminution of its stock if it occurred
as a result of the firm’s discriminatory [lending] practices.238 The Court
was aware of potentially bizarre results such as this and adopted a more
demanding test for proximate cause in order to prevent suits involving such
remote grievances.239
Mr. Robert S. Peck, attorney for the City of Miami, discussed this issue
as well.240 During oral arguments, he explained that the City had a special
interest in fair housing and integrated communities which the FHA was
designed to vindicate.241 He further stated that the employer and the local
dry cleaner do not possess that special interest, even though they have a
relationship with the community and the residents and provide services to
them.242 This demonstrates that even the City of Miami recognized that it
was possible for standing under the FHA to be interpreted too broadly, and
the City did not argue that anyone and everyone should be able to bring suit
under the FHA.243
Mr. Curtis E. Gannon, Assistant to the Solicitor General, argued as
amicus curiae on behalf of the City of Miami.244 Using precedent as
233. Id. art 1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1311 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1307.
237. Eric Vanderhoef, A House Built on Shifting Sands: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act
After Thompson v. North American Stainless, 12 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 83, 93
(2017).
238. Id.
239. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (stating that foreseeability alone is insufficient to
establish proximate cause under the FHA). This is more demanding than the foreseeability theory of
proximate cause adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. Id.
240. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Bank of America Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 44.
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support, he argued that businesses, to the extent that their property values
are diminished, are situated like one of the neighbors in Gladstone.245 In
Gladstone, the Court recognized injury to property values and said that both
a city and the neighbors of the particular residents were directly injured by
decreased property values.246 The neighbors whose property values
decreased were able to recover.247 Gannon stated that harms that flow
directly from changes in property value were contemplated by Congress248
and therefore, deserving of protection.
Gannon disclaimed the potential recovery of local businesses by saying
that if the business is claiming lost profits or a utility company is
complaining about lost customers, those injuries are further afield and not
closely connected to the lenders’ misconduct.249 He presumably meant that
injuries which are such remote results of discriminatory lending practices
are not actionable. Mr. Gannon further argued that Congress took account
of property value, which was recognized in Gladstone.250 That is why
entities such as a utility company are not covered.251 Utility companies
would not suffer injury from a decrease in property values but from a loss of
customers, which was apparently not one of Congress’ concerns when
enacting the FHA.252
However, Mr. Gannon argued that real estate brokers who are involved
in a transaction have an interest in the transaction, even if it is only an
economic interest, so they are able to recover if the transaction fails to go
through because of racial discrimination.253 This type of injury is more
closely related to discriminatory conduct than a loss of profits or customers,
and it would likely be less challenging to prove proximate cause for an
injury such as this.254
Mr. Neal K. Katyal, arguing for the banks, had quite a different take.255
He contended that the City was borrowing someone else’s anti245. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49-50, Bank of America Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 151111).
246. Id. at 49.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 52.
249. Id. at 49-50.
250. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Bank of America Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111).
251. See id. (stating that the harms that flow directly from changes in property value were what
Congress contemplated). Because entities such as utility companies would suffer a loss of customers
rather a decline in property values, Mr. Gannon opined that their injuries would not be covered by the
FHA. Id.
252. See id. (stating that Congress contemplated harms that flow directly from changes in property
value rather than a loss of customers).
253. Id. at 50-51.
254. See id. (stating that because real estate brokers have an interest in the transaction, they would
be able to recover under the FHA).
255. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Bank of America Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111).
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discrimination interests.256 He argued that the direct victims could
obviously sue for discrimination, but the City could not because it was
alleging downstream harm for tax revenues and similar things.257
Furthermore, he stated that the City did not identify an anti-discrimination
harm to itself; it only identified economic harms, so the case was not within
the zone of interests.258
Mr. Katyal focused very strongly on the idea that the City’s injuries
were economic, not anti-discrimination.259 He emphasized that the City was
cutting and pasting the actual borrowers’ injuries.260 He did state that if the
City’s complaint had been written to say that segregation caused blight, it
would have been sufficient.261 Mr. Gannon, on the other hand, argued that
the City should not have to establish a change in the racial composition of a
neighborhood in order to bring a suit because the FHA is intended to ban
“discriminatory housing practices throughout the United States, and that
includes segregated communities that are not changing if there is
discrimination.”262
The differences in opinion between the two sides were settled by the
Court’s decision. Although the Court did not state it outright, the proximate
cause standard the Court adopted will serve to limit the group of persons
who qualify to sue and the types of injuries for which recovery will be
available under the FHA.263 Requiring “‘some direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged’”264 rather than simple
foreseeability alone will restrict who can recover under the FHA. As a
result of this case, municipalities now have more of a chance to recuperate
from the negative economic impacts they experience as a result of
discriminatory lending.265
V.

CONCLUSION

The holding in Bank of Am. Corp. enlarged, with limitations, the
standing of municipalities under the Fair Housing Act.266 The Article III
standing requirements of an “injury in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the
defendant’s conduct and “‘that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
256. Id. at 7-8.
257. Id. at 8.
258. Id. at 9.
259. Id.
260. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Bank of America Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111).
261. Id. at 15.
262. Id. at 52-53.
263. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301-02.
264. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
265. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301-02 (stating that the City’s financial injuries were
arguably within the zone of interests protected by the FHA).
266. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1301.
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judicial decision’”267 are still alive and well, and as long as a municipality
can prove its injuries are within the zone of interests protected by the FHA
and that its injuries were proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, the
municipality has an excellent chance at success. This decision was squarely
in line with precedent268 and this holding was the inevitable next step in the
course of developing standing under the FHA. Municipalities may now
assert certain economic injuries as a result of alleged FHA violations.269
This decision will undoubtedly impact the City of Miami and the
lending industry, and an opening of the floodgates with regard to potential
plaintiffs is not something to worry too much about due to the Court’s
limitation on proximate cause. The United States of America is now one
step closer to combatting the effects of and healing from the adverse
consequences of predatory lending and discriminatory housing practices,
which is likely to greatly aid in alleviating racial inequality as well.
VERONICA NICHOLSON

267. Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547).
268. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1303.
269. See Bank of Am. Corp., 137 S. Ct. at 1301.
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